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Blame the Victim
HOW MISTREATMENT BY THE STATE IS USED TO
LEGITIMIZE POLICE VIOLENCE
TamaraRice Lavet
INTRODUCTION

The surprising thing about George Floyd is not that he
was forcibly arrested for a nonviolent crime.' That is a regular
occurrence for Black men in America.2 Nor is it that he was
killed by the police. A recent study published by the National
Academy of Sciences found that "[p]olice violence is a leading
cause of death for young men"-especially for Black men, who
are 2.5 times more likely than whites to be killed.3 What is
remarkable is that the officer who killed George Floyd was
charged, convicted, and sentenced to more than twenty-two
years in prison. 4

Take Officer Daniel Pantaleo as a point of comparison.
Pantaleo placed Eric Garner in a chokehold after Garner
t Tamara Rice Lave is Professor of Law at University of Miami School of Law.
I would like to acknowledge the insightful comments of the participants at the
symposium on rethinking The Role of the "Victim" in the Criminal Legal System at
Brooklyn Law School and the Legal Theory Workshop at the University of Miami,
especially Susan Bandes, Bennett Capers, Charlton Copeland, Margaret Garvin,
Cynthia Godsoe, Bruce Green, Pat Gudridge, Alexis Karteron, Marnie Mahoney, Kate
Manning, Kate Mogulescu, Kunal Parker, Anna Roberts, Brandon Ruben, Jocelyn
Simonson, and Steve Zeidman. I am particularly indebted to Peter Smuts and Pablo
Rueda for helping me crystallize my argument and craft my writing. This article would
not be what it is without them. Finally, I would be remiss not to thank the editors at the
Brooklyn Law Review for their careful work, especially Julia Cummings and Crystal
Cummings. Any mistakes are my own.
1 Floyd was arrested for buying cigarettes with a $20.00 bill. Evan Hill et al., How
George Floyd Was Killed in Police Custody, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 24, 2022), https://www.ny
times.com/2020/05/31/us/george-floyd-investigation.html [https:/perma.cc/X3KA-Y99U].
2 SHELLEY HYLAND ET AL., OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, NCJ 249216, SPECIAL
REPORT: POLICE USE OF NONFATAL FORCE, 2002-11, at 1 (2015), https://bjs.ojp.gov/
content/pub/pdf/punf0211.pdf [https://perma.cc/LCW5-GMML].
3 Frank Edwards et al., Risk of Being Killed by Police Use of Force in the
United States by Age, Race-ethnicity, and Sex, 116 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. ScIS. 16,793,
16,793-94 (2019).
4 Tim Arango, Derek ChauvinIs Sentenced to 22 and a Half Years for Murder of
George Floyd., N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2021, 3:57 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/
25/us/derek-chauvin-22-and-a-half-years-george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/Y4C8-26PQ].
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denied selling loose, untaxed cigarettes.b A misdemeanor offense.6
Garner died, but a Staten Island grand jury declined to indict
Pantaleo for the killing.? Or Officer Betty Shelby. Shelby
responded to calls "of a stalled SUV left abandoned in the middle
of a road."8 A dashboard camera recorded her shooting unarmed
Terence Crutcher in the back as he walked away from her with
his hands raised above his head.9 A Tulsa jury acquitted her of
manslaughter.10 Or Officer Michael Slager. Slager pulled Walter
Scott over for a broken brake light.11 Scott fled, and Slager
chased him, deploying his taser during the ensuing foot race.12
Scott fell to the ground, but then got up, and after a brief tussle
with Slager, ran away again.13 Slager fired eight times, hitting
Scott five times in the back.4 Slager initially claimed that he had
acted in self-defense, but he was charged with murder after a
cellphone video showed him shooting an unarmed Scott from
behind at a distance of at least fifteen feet.16 A mistrial was
declared after one South Carolina juror wrote a letter to the
court, stating "I cannot in good conscience consider a guilty
6 Al Baker et al., Beyond the Chokehold: The Path to Eric Garner's Death,
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/14/nyregion/eric-garner-police
-chokehold-staten-island.html [https://perma.cc/6NGZ-K9BR].
6 Michael R. Sisak, NYPD Officer Says He Inflated ChargeAgainst Eric Garner,
AP NEWS (May 21, 2019), https://apnews.com/article/ce589240fb884eceab7eaba2bfdff9e2
(last visited May 18, 2022).
? J. David Goodman & Al Baker, Wave of ProtestsAfter GrandJury Doesnt Indict
Officer in Eric GarnerChokehold Case, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 3, 2014), https:/www.nytimes.com/20
14112/04/nyregion/grand-jury-said-to-bring-no-charges-in-staten-island-chokehold-death-of-eric
-garner.html [https://perma.cc/F2HH-MRL7].
8 Erik Ortiz & Phil Helsel, Jury Acquits Tulsa Officer Betty Shelby in ShootingDeath
of Terence Crutcher, NBC NEWS (May 18, 2017), httpsJ/www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/juryacquits-tulsa-officer-shooting-death-terence-crutcher-n761206 [https-/perma.cc/NC8L-F97P].
9 Liam Stack, Video Released in Terence Crutcher's Killing by Tulsa Police,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/20/us/video-released-interence-crutchers-killing-by-tulsa-police.html [https://perma.cc/K8TA-AMPN].
10 Ortiz & Helsel, supra note 8.
11 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Former North Charleston, South
Carolina, Police Officer Michael Slager Sentenced to 20 Years in Prison for Federal
Civil Rights Offense (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-north[https://pe
charleston-south-carolina-police-officer-michael-slager-sentenced-20-years
rma.cc/2SGY-UW25].
12 Id.
13 Id.
14 Id.; see also Jamiel Lynch & Jason Hanna, A Judge Declined to Toss the
Federal Sentence of Ex-officer Michael Slager in Fatal Walter Scott Shooting, CNN (Apr.
20, 2021, 10:17 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2021/04/20/us/michael-slager-walter-scottsentence/index.html [https://perma.cc/9KZD-L3HX].
16 Id.; Jeffrey Collins, Judge Keeps Ex-cop's 20-year Sentence for Killing Black
Man, AP NEWS (Apr. 19, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/shootings-police-walter-scottmichael-slager-south-carolina-9bc7b58a116fbc451671da2a96c3c6b9 (last visited May 18,
2022); Colin Dwyer, Former S.C. Officer Who Killed Walter Scott Sentenced To 20 Years In
Prison, NPR (Dec. 7, 2017, 12:13 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/12/07/569
070544/former-s-c-officer-who-killed-walter-scott-will-be-sentenced-to-up-to-24-years [httpsJ/pe
rma.cc/3KAW-PVSG].
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verdict."16 Slager ended up "plead[ing] guilty to a federal civil rights
offense"17 to avoid the possibility of life in prison at a state facility.18
He was sentenced to twenty years in federal prison for the killing of
Walter Scott.19
Are these killings and their aftermath anomalies or are they
instead reflective of something more systemic? Scholars like Paul
Butler contend that cases like these can best be understood as
manifestations of a structurally racist criminal justice system.20
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva defines structural racism as "specific
mechanisms, practices, and social relations that produce and
reproduce racial inequality at all levels."21 To see if that definition
accurately describes our criminal justice system, I will turn to the
research. Studies have resoundingly shown that, in comparison with
white people, the police are more likely to stop Black people, whether
in a car 22 or on foot,23 more likely to search even though they were
less likely to find contraband,24 more likely to use force,25 more likely
16
Elizabeth Chuck, Lone JurorSays He Can't Convict Ex-cop in Walter Scott Killing,
NBC NEWS (Dec. 5, 2016, 1:43 PM), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/crime-courts/jury-says-it-sdeadlocked-trial-officer-who-shot-walter-n691291 [https:/perma.c/BGV8-VAQQ].
17 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Just., Former North Charleston, South
Carolina, Police Officer Michael Slager Pleads Guilty to Federal Civil Rights Offense
(May 2, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/former-north-charleston-south-carolinapolice-officer-michael-slager-pleads-guilty-federal [https://perma.cc/9SSW-AYYK].
18 Collins, supra note 15.
19 Id.
20 See PAUL BUTLER, CHOKEHOLD: POLICING BLACK MEN 9 (2017); see also Marc
Mauer, The Endurance of Racial Disparity in the Criminal Justice System, in POLICING

THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND IMPRISONMENT 31,42,40-46 (Angela J. Davis

ed., 2017) ("[C]enturies of racism in American society continue to affect criminal justice
practitioners, as it does all Americans, in decision-making, allocation of resources, and
adoption of 'race-neutral' policies with unambiguously racially disparate outcomes."). See
generally POLICING THE BLACK MAN: ARREST, PROSECUTION, AND

IMPRISONMENT,

supra

(collection of essays explaining how and why the criminal justice system disproportionately
mistreats Black men and boys); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS
INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010) (arguing that the mass

incarceration of Black men is a product of continued systemic racial discrimination);
Elizabeth Hinton et al., An Unjust Burden: The DisparateTreatment of Black Americans
in the CriminalJustice System, VERA EVIDENCE BRIEF (Vera Inst. of Just., New York, N.Y.),
May 2018, at 1 (discussing how the modern trend of racial disparities in incarceration
reflects the historical roots of racism in the criminal justice system).
21
Eduardo Bonilla-Silva, Rethinking Racism: Toward a StructuralInterpretation,
62 AM. SOCIO. REV. 465, 476 (1997).
22
Emma Pierson et al., A Large-ScaleAnalysis ofRacial Disparitiesin PoliceStops
Across the United States, 4 NATURE HUM. BEHAV. 736, 737-38 (2020); CHARLES R. EPP ET AL.,
PULLED OVER: HOW POLICE STOPS DEFINE RACE AND CITIZENSHIP 2 (2014).
23 Andrew Gelman et al., An Analysis of the New York City Police Department's
"Stop-and-Frisk"Policy in the Context of Claims of Racial Bias, J. AM. STAT. ASS'N 813,
822 (2007).

24 POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM:
RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 8
(2016), https://igchicago.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/PATFFinalReport_4_13_16-1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/WR4H-3J94]; Gelman et al., supranote 23, at 820-21.
25 HYLAND ET AL., supra note 2, at 2.
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to arrest, 26 and more likely to kill.27 Prosecutors are more likely to
charge Black people with more serious charges than similarly
situated white people28 and less likely to reduce charges.29 And
judges sentence Black defendants to more time for the same offense
as compared to white defendants, even when controlling for age
and prior criminal history.30
This article adds to the literature on structural racism by
examining the institutional mechanisms that support police
violence against Black people. In the process, I illuminate the
insidious ways in which state actors exploit structural social,
economic, and health mistreatment to legitimize police violence.
Police officers exploit this mistreatment in justifying the decision
to arrest and the subsequent use of deadly force; coroners wield it
when assigning cause of death to something other than the police;
prosecutors harness it in rationalizing not to charge; jurors employ

it when deciding not to convict; and judges lean on it when
minimizing punishment. In essence, I argue that a victim's prior
mistreatment by the state is used as institutional mechanisms of
structural racism.
Although I focus on Black people, these arguments could be
extended to other marginalized groups. For example, the history of
racism against, and mistreatment of, American Indians31 and
26
Pierre Thomas et al., ABC News Analysis of Police Arrests Nationwide
Reveals Stark Racial Disparity, ABC NEWS (June 11, 2020, 5:04 AM), https:/abcnews.

go.com/US/abc-news-analysis-police-arrests-nationwide-reveals-stark/story?id=71188546
(last
visited May 18, 2022); Tammy Rinehart Kochel et al., Effect of Suspect Race on Officers'
Arrest Decisions, 49 CRIMINOLOGY 473, 490, 495-96, 498-99 (2011).
27 Edwards et al., supra note 3, at 16,793.
28 Sonja B. Starr & M. Marit Rehavi, Mandatory Sentencing and Racial Disparity:
Assessing the Role of Prosecutorsand the Effects of Booker, 123 Yale L.J. 1, 9, 63 (2013); Charles
Crawford et al., Race, Racial Threat, and Sentencing of Habitual Offenders,
36 CRIMINOLOGY 481, 481--82 (1998).
29 Carlos Berjed6, CriminalizingRace: Racial Disparitiesin Plea Bargaining,
59 B.C. L. REV. 1187, 1188 (2018).
30 U.S. SENT'G COMM'N, DEMOGRAPHIC DIFFERENCES IN SENTENCING:
AN UPDATE TO THE 2012 BOOKER REPORT 16-18, 27-28 (2017), https://bit.ly/3vlI8UY
[https:/perma.ccN48R-CDX3]; see also TUSHAR KANSAI, THE SENTENCING PROJECT,
THE COLOR OF JUSTICE:
LITERATURE 4-5 (2005).

RACIAL DISPARITY IN SENTENCING:

A REVIEW OF THE

31 See generally ROXANNE DUNBAR ORTIZ, AN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE'S HISTORY OF
THE UNITED STATES (2014) (recounting US history from the perspective of indigenous people);
DEE BROWN, BURY MY HEART AT WOUNDED KNEE (1970) (documenting the systematic
destruction of American Indians during the second half of the nineteenth century); DAVID
TREUER, THE HEARTBEAT OF WOUNDED KNEE: NATIVE AMERICA FROM 1890 TO THE PRESENT

(2019) (documenting the Native American struggle for survival and cultural preservation
since the end of the nineteenth century); Mary G. Findling et al., Discriminationin the United
States: Experiences of Native Americans, HEALTH SERVS. RSCH. 1431 (2019),
http://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6773.13224 (last visited Mar. 9, 2022) (examining racial
discrimination against Native Americans across various institutional domains); ANDREA
SMITH, CONQUEST: SEXUAL VIOLENCE AND AMERICAN INDIAN GENOCIDE (2005) (revealing
connections between colonialism and violence against American Indian women).
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Latinx32 people in the United States is well-documented, and there
is clear evidence that this mistreatment impacts policing. For
example, according to the National Academy of Sciences report
mentioned above, American Indian men and Latinx men are
respectively between 1.2 and 1.7 times and 1.3 and 1.4 times more
likely to be killed by the police than white men. 33 Analyzing the
institutional mechanisms that support police violence against
Latinx and American Indians is of paramount importance; however
it is beyond the scope of this article.
This article proceeds as follows. I begin by discussing how
arrest has always been used as a means of exploiting Black people
for the economic benefit of the state, and how the trauma of past
police contact is used to justify arrest. In Part II, I consider police use
of deadly force. I explain why there are little legal or institutional
constraints on an officer's decision to use deadly force, and how and
why that has particularly deadly consequences for Black people. In
Part III, I delve into why so many police killings are not classified as
such and how forensic doctors use traits that are vestiges of slavery
to hide police responsibility. In Part IV, I examine the close
relationship between the prosecutor and the police and how it
impacts the prosecutor's decision to file charges. In Part V, I delve
into why jurors are so unlikely to convict police officers, and in Part
VI, I discuss how, in the rare event that there is a conviction, police
officers benefit from their victim's past mistreatment by getting
lower sentences then they arguably deserve under the law. Lastly,
Part VII builds on the previous parts by suggesting reforms to these
institutions that will bring about meaningful and lasting change.
I.

THE DECISION TO ARREST

It may seem surprising that the police even decided to
arrest George Floyd, Eric Garner, Terence Crutcher, and Walter
Scott. Each man was suspected of committing a low-level,
nonviolent offense.34 The officer could have simply given each of
them a ticket with a notice to appear in court. Instead, the officers
32
See generally MARK D. RAMIREZ & DAVID A.M. PETERSON, IGNORED
RACISM: WHITE ANIMUS TOWARD LATINOS (2020) (expanding discussion of
discrimination against Latinos beyond immigration); PAUL ORTIZ, AN AFRICAN

AMERICAN AND LATINX HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES

(2018) (reinterpreting

American history through the experiences of African and Latinx diaspora); LAURA E.
GOMEZ, INVENTING LATINOS: A NEW STORY OF AMERICAN RACISM (2019) (documenting
how and why Latinos developed a distinct racial identity); Martha Menchaca, Chicano
Indianism: A Historical Account of Racial Repression in the United States, 20 AM.
ETHNOLOGIST 583 (1993) (exploring how the American legal system has long
discriminated against Mexican people).
33
Edwards et al., supra note 3, at 16,794.
34 See supra text accompanying notes 1-19.
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decided to deploy one of their most powerful institutional
mechanisms of structural racism-arrest.
The decision to deprive Black people of their liberty for minor
infractions is not arbitrary; it has been official policy throughout the
history of the United States. Modern-day policing can be traced to
formal slave patrols, which existed throughout nearly all of the
Southern colonies and states. 5 The earliest slave patrols were
established by law in South Carolina in 1704.36 Slave patrollers
"hunted runaways, looked for weapons and stolen goods in slave
cabins, questioned slaves they met on the road, and broke up slave
meetings."37 They could "detain and question whites while
performing their duties, and enter their homes without warrants."38
Slave patrols were legally authorized to render punishment on the
spot or take disobedient slaves to jail.39 "W.L. Bost, a former slave
from western North Carolina," described their brutality in an
interview with Works Progress Administration workers in 1937:
If you wasn't in your proper place when the paddyrollers come they
lash you til' you was black and blue. The women got 15 lashes and the
men 30. That was for jes bein' out without a pass. If the n[*****] done
0
anything worse he was taken to the jail and put in the whippin' post. 4

Slave patrols were legally dismantled at the end of the Civil
War, but their legacy of racial oppression was carried on, not just
by vigilante groups like the Ku Klux Klan, but by another
institutional mechanism of structural racism-the police.41
Despite the nation's formal abolition of slavery in 1865,
the police ensured that de facto slavery continued through the
Second World War.42 Southern states enacted a web of laws,
known as the Black Codes, that criminalized all aspects of Black
life. Among the most notorious were vagrancy laws that were
defined "in [such] sweeping terms . .. [that they] gave local
authorities a virtual mandate to arrest any poor man who did
35
Philip L. Reichel, Southern Slave Patrols as a Transitional Police Type,
7 AM. J. POLICE 51, 59 (1988). There could be a path dependent story that links the
history of slave patrols with modern day policing, however, this type of analysis would
go beyond the scope of this article. See James Mahoney, Path Dependence in Historical
Sociology, 29 THEORY & SOC'Y 507, 507 (2000).
36
See SALLY E. HADDEN, SLAVE PATROLS: LAW AND VIOLENCE IN VIRGINIA AND
THE CAROLINAS 19, 24 (2001).
37 Id. at 40.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 71, 105.
40 Id. at 71.
41 Id. at 168, 218-20.
42 See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-

ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR

II

(2008)

(documenting how abuses of the criminal and civil justice system to enforce exploitative practices
and segregationist laws reenslaved Black Americans through the Second World War).
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not have a labor contract."43 These institutional mechanisms of
structural racism could hypothetically apply to anyone, but "it
was widely understood that these provisions would rarely if ever
be enforced on whites."44 Vagrancy laws were a "mainstay of the
system of involuntary servitude."46 The police enforced them
when there were labor shortages, like during harvest season for
cotton. 46 In Newton, Georgia in 1904, "local officers made
'wholesale arrests of idle Negroes ... to scare them back to the
farms from which they emanated."'47
institutional
another
laws,
Contract-enforcement
mechanism of structural racism, also kept former slaves in
bondage. These laws required that Black workers enter a
contract with their white employers by a certain date or risk
arrest, which prevented them from negotiating a fair wage. 48
Should a freedman be arrested, he was given the "'opportunity'
to sign a voluntary labor contract with his former employer or
some other white who agreed to post bond."49 In 1867, a
Louisiana Freedmen's Bureau agent explained that some
individuals in his area "would, 'for the least provocation, have a
freedman arrested and lodged in jail; some friend of the accuser
will then ... give bond for the freedman, [and] take him to his
plantation and work him there perhaps a full year without
renumeration."'"0 Lawyers were also institutional mechanisms of
structural racism, charging fifty to one hundred dollars for cases
that never went to court, and these fees became part of the
money the freedman owed to his surety.61
It was even worse for those who were convicted of a crime.
Instead of spending time in prison, "[t]hey were leasedliterally, contracted out-to businessmen, planters, and
corporations in one of the harshest and most exploitative labor
systems known in American history."62 Convict leasing, another
institutional mechanism of structural racism, generated
significant funds for state and county government operations,53
but it did so "in a system of labor hardly distinguishable in its
43 William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A
PreliminaryAnalysis, 42 J.S. HisT. 31, 47 (1976).
44 BLACKMON, supra note 42, at 53.
46 Cohen, supranote 43, at 50.

46 Id.

47 Id. (alteration in original).

48 Id. at 53.
49 Id. at 34.
60 Id. at 53 (alterations in original).
51 Id.
52 MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH, 1866-1928, at 1-2 (1996).
53 BLACKMON, supra note 42, at 68-69.
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brutality and coercion from the old slavery that preceded it."54
Workers were chained, beaten, and forced to live in sickness and
squalor.66 If anything, the treatment was worse than during formal
slavery because there was no incentive to treat the workers well.56
"Instead of slave owners, the men who now controlled squads of
black laborers available to the highest bidder were sheriffs,"
Blackmon wrote. 57 "The key distinction, however, between the
sheriff and the old slave masters was that since the African
Americans were not his or anyone else's permanent property, he
had no reason for concern about how they were being treated by
their new keepers or whether they survived at all."6s
Seizing Black people to fund the state is not a relic of the
past: cities, states, and even the federal government still rely on
law enforcement to generate revenue through arrest. 9 One method
is by charging fees related to a person's arrest (investigation costs),
adjudication (attorney costs and trial fees), and incarceration.60 A
2015 Department of Justice report described this practice in
Ferguson, Missouri:
Ferguson's law enforcement practices are shaped by the City's focus on
revenue rather than by public safety needs. ...

The City budgets for sizeable increases in municipal fines and fees
each year, exhorts police and court staff to deliver those revenue increases,
and closely monitors whether those increases are achieved....

The City's emphasis on revenue generation has a profound effect on
FPD's approach to law enforcement.... Partly as a consequence of City and
FPD priorities, many officers appear to see some residents, especially those
who live in Ferguson's predominantly African-American neighborhoods,
less as constituents to be protected than as potential offenders and sources
of revenue. 61

5
55

Id. at 30.
Id. at 52, 69-74.

5 See MANCINI, supra note 52, at 2-3 (recounting the comment of a Southern
delegate after hearing an address denunciating the convict lease system in 1883: "Before
the war, we owned the negroes.'... 'If a man had a good negro, he could afford to keep
him.. . . But these convicts, we don't own 'em. One dies, get another."').
67 BLACKMON, supra note 42, at 64-65.
68 Id.
69 Developments in the Law: Policing, Chapter One Policing and Profit, 128
HARV. L. REV. 1723, 1723, 1726-33 (2015) [hereinafter Policingand Profit].
0 Id. at 1727.
61 C.R. DIV.,
DEP'T OF JUST., INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE
DEPARTMENT 2 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attach
ments/2015/03/04/ferguson_policedepartment-report.pdf [https://perma.cc/K6EP-QSC7].
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The most egregious form of policing for profit is civil asset
forfeiture-"where police can seize property with limited judicial
oversight and retain it for their own use."62 Civil asset forfeiture is
neutral on its face, but it is actually an institutional mechanism of
structural racism. To permanently strip even innocent owners of
their property, the government must generally show by a mere
preponderance of the evidence that the property is related to a
crime.63 No charge or conviction is necessary. 4 One method for
producing civil forfeitures is "highway interdiction," in which the
police use minor traffic violations as a pretext for stopping vehicles
and then seizing property if the driver appears "suspicious."66

Sometimes the police and prosecution work together in so-called
cash-for-freedom deals in which people are threatened with arrest,
charges, and even losing their children if they do not sign away their
property rights.66 Civil forfeiture operations are "widespread and
highly profitable ... [and they] frequently target the poor"67 and
people of color.68 A 2019 study by the Greenville News and Anderson
Independent Mail found that although Black men make up 13
percent of the population for the state of South Carolina, they
represent 65 percent of the people targeted for civil forfeiture in the
state.69 A more recent 2021 study by S. Nicholson-Crotty, J.
62
Leonard v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 847, 848 (2017) (Thomas, J., statement respecting the
denial of certiorari); see also Policingand Profit, supranote 59, at 1730-33. See generally Note,
How Crime Pays: Unconstitutionalityof Modern Civil Asset Forfeitureas a Tool of CriminalLaw
Enforcement, 131 HARV. L. REV. 2387 (2018) [hereinafter How Crime Pays] (explaining how
modern civil forfeiture is unconstitutionally entwined with criminal law enforcement); Anne
Teigan & Lucia Bragg, Evolving Civil Asset Forfeiture, NAT'L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES
https-//www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/evolving-civil-asset2018),
(Feb.
forfeiture-laws.aspx [https-/perma.c/KZ8-8KTF (providing overview offederal and state civil
asset forfeiture at federal and state levels).
63 See How Crime Pays, supra note 62, at 2389; Teigan & Bragg, supra note 62; see
also Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 847 (noting that an appellate court upheld a trial court's issuance of
a forfeiture order because "the government had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that
the [seized] money was either the proceeds of a drug sale or intended to be used in such a sale").
64 Policing and Profit, supra note 59, at 1731 (noting that for centuries civil
forfeiture has not required governments to prove the underlying crime).
66 How Crime Pays, supranote 62, at 2391.
66 Id.; see also Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848.
67 Leonard, 137 S. Ct. at 848. The federal government has received an average of $3
billion annually in recent years, and it is estimated that state and local governments have averaged
$900 million a year. Brian Kelly, An EmpiricalAssessment ofAsset Forfeiture in Light of Timbs v.
Indiana, 72 ALA. L. REV. 613, 621-22 (2021). The money has been spent on "guns, armored
cars, ... electronic surveillance gear,.. .luxury vehicles, [and] travel." Robert O'Harrow Jr. et al.,
Asset Seizures FuelPolice Spending, WASH. POST (Oct. 11, 2014), httpsJ/www.washingtonpost.com/
sf/investigative/2014/10/11/asset-seizures-fuel-police-spending/ [https//permacc/MAF8-XY68].
68 Sean Nicholson-Crotty et al., Race, Representation, and Assets Forfeiture,
24 INT'L PUB. MGMT. J. 47, 61(2021); see also Michael Sallah et al., Stop and Seize: Aggressive
Police Take Hundreds of Millions of Dollars from Motorists Not Charged with Crimes,
WASH. POST (Sept. 6, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/investigative/2014/09/06/
stop-and-seize/?itid=lk_inlinemanual_32 [https://perma.cc/XRV9-9QPC].
69 Anna Lee et al., Taken: How Police Departments Take Millions by Seizing
Property, GREENVILLE NEWS (Apr. 22, 2020, 7:34 PM), https://www.greenvilleonline.com/in-

&
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Nicholson-Crotty, Mughan, and Li analyzing more than 2,200
municipal police departments between 1993 and 2007 found "a

significant relationship between minority population share and
reported forfeiture revenue."70
By preying on Black people, the police benefit from past
mistreatment. A 2020 Gallup poll reported that 71 percent of Black
adults and 34 percent of white adults know people who have been
mistreated by the police.7' Such an experience, whether personal or
observed, has consequences. Studies have found police mistreatment
to be "traumatic"72 and to be associated with depressive symptoms, 73
psychological distress,74 PTSD,76 and self-reported suicide ideation.76
A 2021 study by Pickett, Graham, and Cullen found that personal fear
of the police is widespread among Black respondents and uncommon
among white respondents.77 In addition, 42 percent of Black
respondents (as compared with 11 percent of white respondents)
were "very afraid that . .. police [would] kill them in the next
five years."78 That means when the police pull a Black person
over, he is likely to be nervous and afraid, not because he is doing
something illegal, but because he fears the police. Yet the police
can use his fear and anxiety-fear and anxiety they caused-to
justify conducting a search. And once they search, they may find
a large amount of cash,79 not because the person is doing
something illegal, but because he is likely to distrust the
depth/news/taken/2019/01/27/civil-forfeiture-south-carolina-police-property-seizures-takenexclusive-investigation/2457838002/ [https-/perma.ec/K3YM-MRYV].
70 Nicholson-Crotty et al., supra note 68, at 47.
71 Korpu Momolu, Black Adults More Likely to Know People Mistreated by Police,
GALLUP (Aug. 3, 2020), https://news.gallup.comi/poll/31626/black-adults-likely-know-peoplemistreated-police.aspx [https:/perma.cc/3HVK-GQ38].
72 Jocelyn R. Smith Lee & Michael A. Robinson, "That's My Number One Fearin
Life. It's the Police": Examining Young Black Men's Exposures to Trauma and Loss
Resulting from Police Violence and PoliceKillings, 45 J. BLACK PSYCH. 143, 169-70 (2019).
73 Lisa Bowleg et al., Negative PoliceEncounters and PoliceAvoidance as Pathways
to Depressive Symptoms Among US Black Men, 2015-2016, 110 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 8160,
S160-61 (2020).
74 J.E. DeVylder et al., Prevalence, Demographic Variation and Psychological
Correlates of Exposure to Police Victimisation in Four US Cities, 26 EPIDEMIOLOGY
PSYCHIATRIC ScIS. 466, 474, 476 (2017).
75 J.L. Hirschtick et al., Persistentand Aggressive Interactions with the Police:
Potential Mental Health Implications, EPIDEMIOLOGY & PSYCHIATRIC ScIS. 1, 4
(Feb. 5, 2019), https://doi.org/10.1017/S2045796019000015 [https://perma.cc/6TWA-STMP].
70 J.E. DeVylder et al., Elevated Presence of Suicide Attempts Among Victims
of Police Violence in the USA, 94 J. URB. HEALTH 629, 631 (2017).
77 Justin T. Pickett et al., The American Racial Divide in Fear of the Police, 60
CRIMINOLOGY (forthcoming 2022) (online version of record at 12-16), https://online
library.wiley.com/doi/epdf/10.1111/1745-9125.12298 (last visited May 18, 2022).
78 Id. at 13-14.
79

See FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., FDIC NATIONAL SURVEY OF UNBANKED AND

UNDERBANKED HOUSEHOLD, EXECUTIVE'SUMMARY 13 (2017), httpsJ/economicinclusion.gov/
downloads/2017_FDICUnbankedUnderbanked_HHSurveyExecSumm.pdf [httpsJ/perma
.cc/S9RC-H84Q].
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banking system due to past discrimination0 or be excluded from
it due to present discrimination.81 But the police will point to this
cash as incriminating and seize it, in effect punishing the person
for the accommodations he has had to make due to his past and
present mistreatment.

Victims of race-based, pretext stops should think again if
they are hoping a court might offer some relief. In Whren v.
United States,82 the Supreme Court effectively green lighted
racial profiling by the police,83 thus transforming the Fourth
Amendment into an institutional mechanism of structural
racism. As long as the police have probable cause to stop
someone, "the actual motivations of the individual officers
as
such
"[C]onsiderations
are
irrelevant.84
involved"
Fourth
race ... play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Amendment analysis."86 It is not that discrimination is OK; the
Court "of course" agrees that the "Constitution prohibits
selective enforcement of the law based on considerations such as
race."86 The problem is that the constitutional basis for objecting
is the equal protection clause,87 and the standard for prevailing
is almost impossible to meet. 88 "Racial profiling," Gabriel (Jack)
80 MEHRSA BARADARAN, THE COLOR OF MONEY: BLACK BANKS AND THE RACIAL
WEALTH GAP 260 (2019) ("There are two banking systems in America. One is the
regulated and heavily subsidized mainstream banking industry; the other is the
unregulated, costly, and often predatory fringe industry. The black community has
historically been under the latter system, having been left out of the former.").
81 See Emily Flitter, Banking While Black': How Cashing a Check Can Be a
Minefield, N.Y. TIMES (June 18, 2020), httpsJ/www.nytimes.com/2020/06/18/business/banksblack-customers-racism.html [https://perma.cc/GVY6-3A7A]; see also FDIC National Survey
of Unbanked and Underbanked Households, supranote 79, at 2-4.
82 Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
83. See Kevin R. Johnson, How Racial Profilingin America Became the Law of the
Land: United States v. Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly
Rebellious Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1065-75 (2010); see also Devon W. Carbado, (E)racing
the FourthAmendment, 100 MICH. L. REV. 946, 1032-34 (2002) ("In Whren, the Supreme Court
makes it clear that, at least under the Fourth Amendment, racial profiling claims are not
constitutionally cognizable."); David A. Harris, 'Driving While Black" and All Other Traffic
Offenses, The Supreme Court and Pretextual Traffic Stops, 87 J. CR1M. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 544,
582 (1997) ("We may not always agree on the full contours of the Fourth Amendment, but if
nothing else it stands for-indeed, imposes-restraint on the government's power over the
individual in the pursuit of crime.... Whren upends this venerable and sensible principle .. ");
Tracy Maclin, Race and the Fourth Amendment, 51 VAND. L. REV. 333, 344 (1998) ("The
reasoning of Whren begs the obvious question of why the Court considers police reliance on race
when making a traffic stop reasonable conduct under the Fourth Amendment.").
84 Whren, 517 U.S. at 813.
85

Id.

86 Id.
87

Id.

See Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: Discovering the
Pitfalls ofArmstrong, 73 CHI-KENT L. REV. 605, 605 (1998). For more detailed discussion on
why the prevailing standard under the equal protection clause is difficult to meet, see Kristin
E. Kruse, ProvingDiscriminatoryIntent in Selective Prosecution Challenges-An Alternative
Approach to United States v. Armstrong, 58 SMU L. REV. 1523, 1527-28, 1533-36 (2005); and
88
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Chin and Charles J. Vernon write, "may be unconstitutional, yet
it is reasonable, and therefore provides no basis for suppression
of evidence."89
II.

THE DECISION TO USE DEADLY FORCE

The US Constitution limits when the police may kill a
suspect. In Tennessee v. Garner, the Supreme Court held that the
police may only use deadly force when they have probable cause to
believe the suspect "poses a threat of serious physical harm, either
to the officer or to others."90 It is not obvious how George Floyd, Eric
Garner, Terence Crutcher, and Walter Scott could have posed such
a threat. Their alleged crimes were nonviolent, and none of them had
a weapon. So, how did they end up dead?
Answering that question first requires a deeper dive into
Supreme Court jurisprudence, which, at least in this area of law,
functions as an institutional mechanism of structural racism.
Although an officer is supposed to have probable cause to believe a
suspect is dangerous before he can use deadly force, there is not
much bite to that limitation.91 In Graham v. Connor, the Court held
that "[t]he 'reasonableness' of a particular use of force must be
judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight."92 "The calculus of
reasonableness," the Court wrote, "must embody allowance for the
fact that police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments-in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly
evolving-about the amount of force that is necessary in a particular
situation."93 Later, in Scott v. Harris, the Court made it clear that
officers did not have to meet any preconditions before they could use
deadly force.94 Jeff Fagan and Alexis D. Campbell explained why
these cases are so problematic: "[I]n addition to being opaque and
defaulting nearly completely to an officer's subjective judgements,
Graham and Scott neither instruct police officers as to what is
Pamela S. Karlan, Race, Rights, and Remedies in CriminalAdjudication, 96 MICH. L. REV.
2001, 2003-04, 2023-27 (1998). See also Gabriel J. Chin, Race, the War on Drugs, and the
CollateralConsequencesof CriminalConviction, 6 J. GENDERRACE & JUST. 253, 266-67, 271-73 (2002) (presenting statistics showing racial disparity in prosecution for drug offenses and
explaining why it is difficult to prove discrimination).
89 Gabriel J. Chin & Charles J. Vernon, Reasonable but Unconstitutional:Racial
Profiling and the Radical Objectivity of Whren v. United States, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 882,
886 (2015).
90 Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985).
91 Rachel A. Harmon, When Is Police Violence Justified?, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1119,
1119-20 (2008) (describing the Supreme Court's standard for the Fourth Amendment doctrine,
especially as applied to nondeadly force, as "indeterminate and undertheorized" and "incomplete").
92 Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396 (1989).
9 Id. at 396-97.
94 Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 382 (2007).
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reasonable nor direct courts as to how to properly evaluate the
reasonableness of an officer's actions."95
Not only is an officer unlikely to be prosecuted for using
but there is little chance he will be held civilly liable.96
force,
deadly
Although federal law allows victims of police violence to bring civil
suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against individual officers, and in some
cases entire police departments,97 qualified immunity-another
institutional mechanism of structural racism-creates an almost
insurmountable bar to recovery. 98 Under this defense, the officer will
prevail if he can show that his conduct did not violate "a statutory or
constitutional right that was clearly established at the time of the
challenged conduct."99 However, a court is allowed to grant qualified
immunity without ever determining whether the purported right
exists at all.100 Instead the court may focus solely on the question of
whether the right was "clearly established."101 "To be clearly
established," the Court explained, "a right must be sufficiently clear
that 'every reasonable officer would [have understood] that what he
is doing violates that right."'102 "In other words," the Court went on,
'"existing precedent must have placed the statutory or constitutional
question beyond debate."'103 In a 2018 dissent in Kisela v. Hughes,
Justice Sotomayor criticized the Court's "one-sided approach to
qualified immunity [which] transforms the doctrine into an absolute
shield for law enforcement officers.. . . It tells officers that they can
shoot first and think later, and it tells the public that palpably
unreasonable conduct will go unpunished."lo
Furthermore, in the unusual event that there is a settlement
or judgment against an individual officer, he is unlikely to pay
anything out of his own pocket.15 In 2014, Joanna Schwartz
conducted a national study of police indemnification, and found that
governments forked out 99.8 percent of the money awarded to
plaintiffs in lawsuits claiming civil rights violations by law
95 Jeffrey A. Fagan & Alexis D. Campbell, Race and Reasonableness in Police
Killings, 100 B.U. L. REV. 951, 963 (2020).
96 Devon W. Carbado, Blue-on-Black Violence: A ProvisionalModel of Some of
the Causes, 104 GEO. L.J. 1479, 1519-22 (2016).
97 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (creating a statutory right for private litigants to bring civil
suits against state agents who deprive them of their "rights, privileges, or immunities").
91 See Carbado, supra note 96, at 1520-22; see also Andrew Chung et al., For Cops
Who Kill, Special Supreme Court Protection, REUTERS (May 8, 2020, 12:00 PM),
https:/www.reuters.com/investigates/special-reportlusa-police-immunity-scotus/ (last visited
May 18, 2022).
99 Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012).
100 Id.
101 Id. (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 227 (2009)).
102
Id. (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
103 Id. (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741).
104
Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
105
See Joanna C. Schwartz, PoliceIndemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 885, 887 (2014).
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enforcement.106 Officers did not even pay a cent of the punitive
damages awarded.107 For some of the jurisdictions in her study,
including Atlanta, Boston, Cook County, Miami, Phoenix, and San
Francisco, Schwartz wrote, "officers are more likely to be struck by
lightning than they are to contribute to a settlement or judgment in
a police misconduct suit."108

Nor is an

officer

likely to

suffer any professional

repercussions. Even when an officer has engaged in egregious

misconduct, and even when his superiors want to fire or at least
formally reprimand him, it is difficult to do so because of police
unions'09-yet another institutional mechanism of structural
racism. As Stephen Rushin explains, police union contracts shield
officers from accountability.110 "Across America's largest cities,"
Rushin writes, "many police officers receive excessive procedural
protections during internal disciplinary investigations, effectively
immunizing them from the consequences of misconduct."1 And in
the rare event an officer is fired for using excessive force, he knows
he can probably land another job in law enforcement.112
Making matters worse, police officers in the United States
enter this ambiguous, consequence-free terrain already primed to
use deadly force. They are taught to see every citizen interaction as
dangerous, to view even the most nebulous of encounters as being
potentially lethal.13 As Seth Stoughton, a law professor and
former police officer, explains:
[Officers] are constantly barraged with the message that ... they
should be afraid, that their survival depends on it. Not only do officers
hear it in formal training, they also hear it informally from supervisors

Id. at 890.
Id.
108 Id. at 914.
109 Daniel Oates, Opinion:I Used to Be a Police Chief This Is Why It's So Hard to Fire
106

107

Bad Cops., WASH. POST (June 12, 2020), https:/www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/0/12/iused-be-police-chief-this-is-why-its-so-hard-fire-bad-cops/ [https//perma.cc/B78B-5EUA].
110 Stephen Rushin, Police Union Contracts, 66 DUKE L.J. 1191, 1253 (2017).
1u

Id.

Ben Grunwald & John Rappaport, The Wandering Officer, 129 YALE L.J. 1676,
1687-88 (2020); Abe Street, How Violent Cops Stay in Law Enforcement, NEW YORKER
(May 21, 2021), https://www.newyorker.com/news/us-journal/how-violent-cops-stay-inlaw-enforcement [https://perma.cc/FS5F-7FZ4]; Ryan Mills et al., Analysis: Most Florida
Officers Disciplinedfor Excessive Force Kept Their Jobs, FLA. TIMES-UNION (June 6, 2020),
https://www.jacksonvlle.com/story/news/crime/2020/06/06/analysis-most-florida-officers-d
isciplined-for-excessive-force-kept-their-jobs/41740219/ [https://perma.cc/R5GC-3K5H].
113 See David A. Harris, How Fear Shapes Policing in the US, in THE
CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF POLICING IN THE UNITED STATES 200, 200-01 (Tamara Rice
Lave & Eric J. Miller eds., 2019).
112
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and older officers. They talk about it with their peers. They see it on
police forms and in law enforcement publications. 1 4

The end result is an exaggerated fear. "No one would argue that
officers do not, at least sometimes, face violence -even deadly
violence," David Harris explains, "But the picture captured in the
data about what police actually experience varies considerably from
the rhetoric and images one sees in the training police receive."11
Harris then discusses FBI data that finds that, between 2003 and
2013, an average of fifty-one police officers were killed every year." 6
This number reflects the total number of felonious deaths of
duly sworn [local,] state, tribal, and federal law enforcement
officers . . . working in an official capacity . .. [with] full arrest
powers .. . ordinarily w[earing] a badge and firearm. ... paid from
governmental funds set aside specifically for payment of sworn law
enforcement representatives. .. . [and the officers' deaths] .. . [were]
7
directly related to injuries received during the incidents."

Frank Zimring fills out the picture further by showing that in
the period from 1977 to 2012, killings of officers dropped by 68
percent, while justifiable killings by police dropped by 9
percent." 8 That means the number of justified killings by police
remained roughly the same even as the risk of being killed
dropped significantly.

The unlikelihood of criminal, civil, or professional
consequences, along with the "warrior mentality,"119 help explain
114 Seth W. Stoughton, How Police Training Contributes to Avoidable Deaths,
ATLANTIC (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2014/12/policegun-shooting-training -ferguson/383681 [https://perma.cc/7T6L-PP24].
"1 Harris, supra note 115, at 205.
1i6
Id. Harris refers to data compiled by the FBI as partof Law Enforcement Officers
Killed and Assaulted (LEOKA). The FBI has been gathering this data since 1996. In 2013,
the FBI provided a table containing data on the total number of felonious killings of activeduty officers from 2004 to 2013. The total number was 511. See 2013 Law Enforcement
Officers Killed & Assaulted-Table 1, https:/ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2013/tables/tableileos_fk_re
giongeographicdivision_and_stat_2004-2013.xls [https://perma.cc/6MPQ-WZPK].
i17
2013 Law Enforcement Officers Killed & Assaulted, FBI-Criteria:Which Officers
Are in This Report?, FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/leoka/2013/felonious_
accidental-assaultscriteria/officer__criteria-2013 [https://perma.cc/4RMG-MMIUZ].
11
Franklin E. Zimring, What Drives Variations in Killings by Urban Police in
the United States: Two Empirical Puzzles, in THE CAMBRIDGE HANDBOOK OF POLICING
IN THE UNITED STATES, supra note 113, at 296, 298. Zimring is confident that data on
killings of officers is accurate, however he describes "several features of the reporting
system for justifiable homicides by police that require some compromises in the research
strategy and qualifications from its results." Id. at 296, 299.
uS Seth W. Stoughton, Law Enforcements'"Warrior"Problem, 128 HARV. L. REV. F.
225, 226 (2015); id. at 226-30 ("[T]he warrior mindset refers to a bone-deep commitment to
survive a bad situation no matter the odds or difficulty, to not give up even when it is mentally
and physically easier to do so. ... Unfortunately .... [t]he warrior mindset has mutated into
the warrior mentality.... Under this warrior worldview, officers are locked in intermittent
and unpredictable combat with unknown but highly lethal enemies. As a result, officers learn
to be afraid.. . . Officers learn to treat every individual they interact with as an armed threat

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

1176

[Vol. 87:4

why police officers in the United States kill many more people
per capita than those in other advanced democracies.12o And it is
Black people who are most likely to die. A recent study published
in The Lancet compared data on police violence from the US
to
three
System
(NVSS)
Statistics
National
Vital
nongovernmental, open-source databases.121 The study found
that, from 1980 to 2019, the age-standardized mortality rate due
to police violence for non-Hispanic Black people was 3.5 times
higher than that for non-Hispanic white people.122 Another study
found that "Black men [we]re about 2.5 times more likely to be
killed by police over the[ir] life course than . .. white men. Black
women [we]re about 1.4 times more likely to be killed by police
than . .. white women."123

In explaining their decision to use deadly force, police
officers often say they thought the victim was armed and
dangerous even if-like George Floyd, Eric Garner, Terence
Crutcher, and Walter Scott--he was not. 124 The officer might be
lying, but it is also possible he was genuinely mistaken due to
unconscious prejudice (implicit bias), which caused him to see
"blacks, especially young men, as violent, hostile, aggressive, and
dangerous."126 This means even an officer who sincerely disavows
racism might still perceive behavior to be threatening if done by
a Black person but innocuous if done by a white person. 126
Over the past forty-five years, social psychologists have
studied the impact implicit bias has on the interpretation of
and every situation as a deadly force encounter in the making. Every individual, every
situation-no exceptions.... This approach inevitably affects the way that officers interact
with civilians. First, it creates a substantial, if invisible, barrier to true community
policing.. .. Counterintuitively, the warrior mentality also makes policing less safe for both
officers and civilians.... The expansive version of the warrior mentality promotes the use of
tactics that needlessly create use of force situations, and the fierce rhetoric that follows further
fans the flames." (footnotes omitted)).
120
See Jamiles Lartey, By the Numbers: US Police Kill More in Days than Other
Countries Do in Years, GUARDIAN (June 9, 2015, 6:00 AM), https:/www.theguardian.com/usnews/2015/jun/09/the-counted-police-killings-us-vs-other-countries (last visited Mar. 8, 2022). It
makes sense that officers would be less careful if they know they are unlikely to go to jail
for shooting someone. The possibility of a civil suit does not pose much of a deterrent due
to qualified immunity, which has established an almost insurmountable bar to recovery.
See supra notes 96-104 and accompanying text.
121 GBD 2019 Police Violence US Subnational Collaborators, Fatal Police
Violence by Race and State in the USA, 1980-2019: A Network Meta-Regression,
398 LANCET 1239, 1241 (2021) [hereinafter FatalPolice Violence by Race and State].
122 Id. at 1245.
123
Edwards et al., supra note 3, at 16,794.
124
See Cynthia Lee, "But I Thought He Had a Gun"-Race and Police Use of
Deadly Force, HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 1,18 (2004); see also Fagan & Campbell,
supra note 95, at 991-1004; Trivedi & Van Cleve, supra note 192, at 901.
126 See L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95
MINN. L. REV. 2035, 2039 (2011).
126

Id.
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ambiguous information.127 In a groundbreaking study, Birt L.
Duncan asked subjects to view what they thought was a live
interaction in which two actors get increasingly argumentative

until one shoves the other.128 The dialogue and behavior were
identical, but Duncan varied the race of the actors. If the harmdoer was white, subjects were more likely to label the behavior as
a "little 'horseplay"'; however, if the harm-doer was Black, they
were more likely to label it "violent behavior."129
Researchers have also examined the impact of race on the
decision to shoot.130 Correll, Park, Judd, and Wittenbrink asked
undergraduate subjects to participate in a computer simulation in
which they had to decide whether a male suspect who appeared on
screen was holding a gun or a nongun object.131 If he was holding a
gun, they were supposed to quickly hit a button labeled "shoot."132

If it was a neutral object, however, they were supposed to hit a
"don't shoot" button.133 Correll and his colleagues found that
subjects "decided not to shoot an unarmed [white suspect] more
quickly than an unarmed [Black suspect]" and were more likely to
mistakenly shoot a Black unarmed suspect. 134 "Both in speed and
accuracy," Correll and his colleagues wrote, "the decision to fire on
an armed target was facilitated when that target was African
American, whereas the decision not to shoot an unarmed target
was facilitated when that target was White."136 E. Ashby Plant and
B. Michelle Peruche repeated this same study in Florida with fifty

127
See, e.g., H.A. Sagar & J.W. Schofield, Racial and Behavioral Cues in Black and
White Children'sPerceptionsofAmbiguously Aggressive Acts, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
590-98 (1980) (finding that sixth grade boys were more likely to judge ambiguous behaviorlike two boys bumping into each other or borrowing a pencil without asking-to be mean and
threatening when the boy was Black instead of white); Kurt Hugenberg & Galen V.
Bodenhausen, Research Report, Ambiguity in Social Categorization:The Role of Prejudice and
FacialAffect in Race Categorizations,15 PSYCH. SC. 342, 342-45 (2004) (finding that subjects
evaluated the same facial expressions as more hostile on a Black face than a white face).
128 Birt L. Duncan, Differential Social Perception and Attribution of Intergroup
Violence: Testing the Lower Limits of Stereotyping ofBlacks, 34 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.

590, 590, 592 (1976).
129 Id. at 595-97.
130 See, e.g., Samantha Moore-Berg et al., Quick to the Draw: How Suspect Race
and Socioeconomic Status Influences Shooting Decisions, J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCH. 1-10

(2017) (finding that both suspect race and socioeconomic status (SES) impacted shooting
decisions with subjects shooting armed high-SES Black suspects faster than armed white
high SES suspects and responded "don't shoot" faster for unarmed high-SES white suspects
than unarmed Black SES suspects).
131
Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer's Dilemma: Using Ethnicity to
DisambiguatePotentially Threatening Individuals, 83 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCH.
1314, 1315 (2002).
132 Id. at 1316-17.
133 Id. at 1316.

134

Id. at 1317.

135

Id. at 1325.
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certified sworn law-enforcement officers.136 They found that "officers
were initially more likely to mistakenly shoot unarmed Black
suspects" as compared with unarmed white suspects, but this bias
was eliminated in later trials when the officers became familiar with
the program. 137 Plante and Peruche's findings suggest that "it may
be possible to eliminate racial biases in responses to criminal
suspects," but they acknowledge "there is currently no evidence that
the elimination of bias in response to the simulation generalizes to
other types of responses (e.g., decisions in the field)."138
Although implicit bias may be unintentional, it is not
accidental. Kathleen Osta and Hugh Vasquez at the National Equity
Project emphasize that we are not born with bias, but instead we
learn it.139 "The negative associations and assumptions we make
about people of color have been wired into our unconscious mind over
hundreds of years and show up in all of our institutions today."140 In
a 2019 study, Payne, Vuletich, and Brown-Iannuzzi studied the
historical roots of implicit bias.141 They found white residents of
states and counties "with a higher proportion of their populations
enslaved in 1860 had greater anti-Black implicit bias."142 "Rather
than solely a feature of individual minds," they wrote, "implicit bias
may be better understood as a cognitive manifestation of historical
and structural inequalities."143
III.

THE DECISION TO CLASSIFY

The fact that the deaths of George Floyd, Eric Garner,
Terence Crutcher, and Walter Scott were attributed to the police
was no means a given. A recent study in The Lancet estimated
30,800 police killings between 1980 and 2018-17,100 more than
recorded in the NVSS.144 That means 55 percent of all estimated
deaths due to police violence in the United States between 1980
and 2018 were not properly accounted for in official records.45

136 E. Ashby Plant & B. Michelle Peruche, The Consequences of Race for Police
Officers'Responses to Criminal Suspects, 16 PSYCH. SCI. 180, 181 (2005).
137
Id. at 182.
136 Id. at 183.
139 Kathleen Osta & Hugh Vasquez, Implicit Bias and StructuralInequity, NAT'L
EQUITY PROJECT 2, https://staticl.squarespace.com/static/5e32157bff63c7446f3f1529/t/

5f173bc8da7d1115210824c0/1595358153358/National-Equity-Project-Implicit-Bias.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LAG9-32PE].
140 Id. at 2.
141 B. Keith Payne et al., HistoricalRoots of Implicit Bias in Slavery, 116 PROC.
NAT'LACAD. SCis. 11,693, 11,693 (2019).
142 Id. at 11,694.
143 Id. at 11,697.
144 See FatalPolice Violence by Race and State, supra note 121, at 1243.
145 Id. at 1247.
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Although this underreporting occurred across all racial groups,
it was highest for Black Americans (59 percent).146
To understand how a mistake of this magnitude could
occur, we must consider how this information is recorded. As The
Lancet article authors explain, medical doctors usually fill out
the cause of death, unless there is suspicion of crime or foul play
(including police violence), in which case the medical examiner
or coroner is supposed to enter such information.147 According to
the World Health Organization, deaths resulting from police
violence should be explicitly classified as such.14s Such a rule is
critical because if the person filling out the death certificate does
not mention that the decedent was killed by the police, then the
death will not be assigned for legal intervention.149 This makes
the medical examiner/coroner an institutional mechanism of
structural racism because, as The Washington Post explained,
"once a death is determined to be accidental or natural, there is
no investigation"150 meaning that the police officer will almost
never face criminal prosecution for killing a Black person or
anyone else.1"1
And who is the coroner or medical examiner? Coroners
are often elected officials, and for the most part, "there are no
age, education, or ... medical training requirements."162 Only
four states even "require ... coroners to be physicians."1i3
Despite their importance, some states do not have a separate
office of the coroner but instead allow government officials like
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id. at 1248.
149 Id.
150 Radley Balko, Opinion, It's Time to Abolish the Coroner, WASH. POST (Dec.
12, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-watch/wp/2017/12/12/its-time-toabolish-the-coroner/ [https://perma.cc/MF3U-9K7M].
161 Scholars show that coroners have actually used their power to erase violence
against Black people since before the Civil War. For example, Gaby et al. wrote,
"Drawing on the extended case study of the Willis Jackson lynching, we detail coroner
administrative performances intended to uphold white innocence and elite interests
through generating official documentation on black deaths with an absence of evidence
or through the introduction of inconclusive evidence." Sarah Gaby et al., Exculpating
Injustice: Coroner Constructions of White Innocence in the Postbellum South, 7 SOCIUs:
Socio. RSCH. FOR A DYNAMIC WORLD 1, 9 (2021).
162
Ira P. Robbins, A Deadly Pair: Conflicts of Interest Between Death
Investigatorsand Prosecutors,79 OHIO STATE L.J. 901, 909 (2018).
163 Maanvi Singh, How America's Broken Autopsy System Can Mask Police Violence,
GUARDIAN (July 3, 2020, 8:13 PM), https-/www.theguardian.com/us-news/2020/jul/02/autop
sies-police-killings-medical-misleading [https-/perma.c/4DYE-7MC5]. The four states are:
Kansas, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-226 (West, Westlaw through the 2022 Reg. Sess. of the Kan.
Leg. effective on Mar. 10, 2022); Louisiana, see LA. STAT. ANN. § 13:5704 (Westlaw through the
2021 Reg. Sess. and Veto Sess.); Minnesota, see MINN. STAT. ANN. § 390.005 (West, Westlaw
through the end of the 2021 Reg. and Called Sess. of the 87th Leg.); and Ohio, see OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 313.02 (West, Westlaw through file 75 of the 134th Gen. Assemb. (2021-2022)).
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prosecutors and even sheriffs to assume the role.154 In California,
for example, the elected sheriff automatically assumes the coroner's
duties in forty-eight of the state's fifty-eight counties.155 Medical
examiners, in contrast, are usually licensed physicians, and they are
often required to be trained in forensic pathology.166 Unfortunately,
there are not enough medical examiners to staff available
positions.167 Some states have hybrid systems "in which a medical
examiner" does the autopsy, but the coroner makes the final
determination as to manner of death.168
Given the power coroners and medical examiners have in
determining whether, how, and if a killing will be prosecuted, it
is critical that they remain independent. Yet 70 percent of
respondents of a web-based survey of the National Association of
Medical Examiners (NAME) reported having been pressured by
an elected official or appointee to alter the cause or manner of
death, and some reported experiencing negative consequences

when they resisted.19 Such pressure can be particularly acute
when coroners/medical examiners are investigating a death in
police custody. These officials often work for, or are housed in,
police departments, which, as the authors of The Lancet article
argue, creates a clear conflict of interest and may disincentivize
recording police involvement in a death.160 The problem is serious
enough that the NAME Board of Directors released a position
paper in which it wrote, "While medical examiners and coroners
necessarily work with police in the investigation of death, and
should have access to law enforcement reports, they should not be
dependent upon the police for all their information and should not
be subject to pressure from police to modify their conclusions."11
Should there be a conflict of opinion between a medical
examiner and a politically appointed or elected coroner, the
medical examiner may lose even though he is the only one with
extensive training in forensic pathology. That is what happened
in 2017 in San Joaquin County, California.12 Two medical
16

See FatalPolice Violence by Race and State, supra note 123, at 1247-48.
15 See Balko, supra note 150. Note that in 2017, Balko wrote that coroners
automatically assumed the role of coroner in forty-one counties, but according to the official
California website, it was actually forty-eight. Sheriff-Coroner, CAL. STATE ASS'N OF CNTYS.,
https:/www.counties.org/county-office/sheriff-coroner [https-//perma.cc/Z4ZV-57JU].
166 See Robbins, supra note 152, at 910.
167
158

Id.

at 910-11.

Balko, supra note 150.
169 Judy Melinek et al., NationalAssociation of Medical Examiners PositionPaper:
Medical Examiner, Coroner, and Forensic Pathologist Independence, 3 ACAD. FORENSIC
PATHOLOGY 93, 93 (2013).
160
FatalPolice Violence by Race and State, supra note 121, at 1250.
161 Melinek et al., supranote 159, at 97.
162 See Balko, supranote 150.
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examiners-one of whom (Bennett Omalu) was hired ten years
earlier to modernize and professionalize the county's medical
examiner's office-resigned because they alleged the SheriffCoroner (Steve Moore) was putting pressure on them to alter their
autopsy findings for deaths in police custody.163 The two started
documenting specific incidents in which Moore classified particular
deaths as "accidents" instead of "homicides" to safeguard the police
from prosecution.164 In one notable case, Omalu found that Samuel
Augustine Jr. had died of a traumatic brain injury and spinal cord
injury while being arrested and deemed the manner of death
homicide.16 After Moore told Omalu he was wrong and requested
that Omalu change his findings, Omalu wrote: "This is simply
daylight corruption and nothing else.' ... 'He is using his office and
powers to protect police officers."'166

If a person dies in police custody, how do coroners/medical
examiners explain it away? Sometimes they attribiute the death to
so-called "excited delirium," a controversial diagnosis that refers to
a "condition characterized by the abrupt onset of aggression and
distress, typically in the setting of illicit substance use, often
culminating in sudden death."167 Neither the American Psychiatric
Association168 nor the World Health Organization169 recognize
excited delirium as a valid diagnosis, and the American Medical
Association denounces it as "a sole justification for law enforcement
use of excessive force."170

Other times, the death report lists underlying health
conditions, like hypertension or sickle cell trait (SCT), that could not
have caused the person's death.171 A May 2021 investigation by The
New York Times uncovered at least forty-six cases "over the past
[twenty-five years] in which medical examiners, law enforcement
officials, or defenders of accused officers" identified SCT "as a cause
or major factor in" the "deaths of Black people in custody" even
though about two-thirds of them had also been forcefully
163 Id.
164

Id.

165

Id.

166

Id.

Joshua Budhu et al., How "ExcitedDelirium" Is Misused to Justify Police
Brutality, BROOKEINGS INST. (Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.brookings.edulblog/how-we[https://per
rise/2020/08/10/how-excited-delirium-is-misused-to-justify-police-brutality/
ma.cc/245N-KTE6].
166 See COUNCIL ON PSYCHIATRY & L., AM. PSYCHIATRIC AsS'N, POSITION
167

STATEMENT

ON CONCERNS ABOUT USE OF THE TERM "EXCITED

DELIRIUM" AND

APPROPRIATE MEDICAL MANAGEMENT IN OUT-OF-HOSPITAL CONTEXTS (2020).
169
See Singh, supra note 153; Budhu et al., supra note 167.
170 Press Release, Am. Med. Ass'n, New AMA Policy Opposes "Excited Delirium"
Diagnosis (June 14, 2021), https://www.ama-assn.org/press-center/press-releases/newama-policy-opposes-excited-delirium-diagnosis [https://perma.cc/DLW2-D5JU].
171 See Singh, supra note 153.
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restrained, pepper sprayed, or "shocked with stun guns."172
Blaming these deaths on SCT likely allowed the offending
officers to avoid criminal or civil penalties.
In support of The New York Times investigation, three
hematologists who specialize in SCT and sickle cell disease
wrote an opinion piece explaining how benign SCT really is.13
They clarified that SCT "is not a disease and is not associated
with decreased life expectancy."174 It is "extremely common," and
most people "will live normal life spans with no adverse health
events related to SCT."176 "Cases of sudden death in people with
SCT," they state, "are the ... exception rather than the rule."176
The hematologists then contextualize The New York Times
findings within a larger context of past victimization:
The medical field ... has a shameful history of creating and
perpetuating the pseudoscience of race-based physiological differences
and performing unethical research. The onus is therefore on us, as
physicians, to publicly denounce the use of these outdated and racist
notions when they are used to provide cover for the mistreatment and
murder of Black men and women at the hands of the police. 177

The fact that the medical examiners thought they could get away
with blaming SCT for these men's death is especially perverse.
Sickle cell disease (SCD), is a painful, life-threatening blood
disorder that is caused by inheriting the SCT from each
parent.178 Its presence "in the United States, [a]s a direct result
of the transatlantic slave trade," and most of those who suffer
from it are Black.179 In an article in The New England Journal
of Medicine, Alexandra Power-Hays and Patrick T. McGann
172
Michael LaForgia & Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, How a Genetic Trait in Black
People Can Give the Police Cover, N.Y. TIMES (May 15, 2021), https://www.nytimes.
com/2021/05/15/us/african-americans-sickle-cell-police.html [https:/perma.cc/FE42-MSM4].
K.C. Cage-Singleton is a glaring example of this practice. Id. Cage-Singleton was chased by
the police into an apartment complex "because they thought his clothing resembled that of' a
suspect in an armed robbery. Id. There they "shocked him with a stun gun and beat him with
a baton." Id. Although the coroner indicated Cage-Singleton had suffered a number "of
injuries, including abrasions, lacerations, and broken teeth,... the manner and cause of

death were 'undetermined."' Id. Instead, the coroner cited '"probable' sickle cell trait." Id.
173
A. Kyle Mack et al., Some MedicalExaminers Say Sickle Cell Trait Causes Sudden
Death-They're Wrong, SCI. AM. (June 20, 2021), https-/www.scientificamerican.
com/article/some-medical-examiners-say-sickle-cell-trait-causes-sudden-death-theyre-wrong/
[httpsJ/perma.cc/V4KH-S953].
174
176

Id.
Id.
Id.

177

Id.

171

178 Alexandra Power-Hays & Patrick T. McGann, When Actions Speak Louder
than Words-Racism and Sickle Cell Disease, 383 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1902, 1902 (2020);
What Is Sickle Cell Trait?, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/sicklecell/traits.html [https://perma.cc/Q69V-P2NT].
179 Power-Hays & McGann, supra note 178, at 1902.
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compare funding for SCD with cystic fibrosis, which is a
comparable disease, but it affects mostly white Americans.180
"Cystic fibrosis affects one third fewer Americans than SCD but
receives 7 to 11 times the research funding per patient, which
results in disparate rates of development of medications:
currently, the Food and Drug Administration has approved 4
medications for SCD and 15 for cystic fibrosis."181 Not only has
the development of SCD modifying therapies remained minimal,
but those suffering from the disease receive subpptimal care. 182
As Power-Hays and McGann explain:
Despite inexorable pain, patients report getting dressed nicely before
presenting to the emergency department in an attempt to avoid
judgment and receive better care.. . . Deplorably, especially in the
midst of the opioid crisis, patients with SCD are often described as
drug seekers and accused of feigning their pain, which results in
inadequate treatment and more suffering. Because of the challenges
in receiving adequate care and the stress associated with perceived
racial stigma, many patients choose to avoid care altogether, further
183
increasing the risk of life-threatening complications.

Not only are medical examiners and coroners too beholden to the
police, but one of the lies they tell to hide police brutality hinges
on a disease that would not be here if men, women, and children
had not been kidnapped from Africa and brought to America as
slaves. And the disease would not have taken on mythical powers
of destruction if the US health care system adequately funded its
treatment and fairly treated the people suffering from it.
IV.

THE DECISION TO CHARGE

Although prosecutors ultimately filed charges against the
officers who killed George Floyd, Terence Crutcher, and Walter
Scott,184 such prosecutions are rare. According to Mapping Police
Violence, which compiles data from media reports, obituaries,
public records, and databases, 9,901 people were killed by the
police between 2013 and 2021,18 but less than 3 percent a year

were charged with a crime.186 Policing is a dangerous job, and
undoubtedly, many of those killings were justified to protect the life
of the officer or a third party. However, given that 37 percent of the
180

Id.

181

Id.

182

Id.
Id. at 1902-03.
See supra text accompanying notes 1-19.

183
184

186 See SAMUEL SINYANGWE ET AL., MAPPING POLICE VIOLENCE, 2021 POLICE
VIOLENCE REPORT 3 (2021), https://policeviolencereport.org [https://perma.cc/7H92-4UVJ].
186
See id. at 6.
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killings in 2021 began with either nonviolent offense-traffic stops
(10 percent),187 mental health checks (9 percent),188 or other
nonviolent offenses (18 percent),189 how could so-called "ministers
of justice" prosecute just 1 percent of these cases?190
Prosecutors have an "entangled,"191 "codependent"192
relationship with the police, which turns them into institutional
mechanisms of structural racism. "From a structural standpoint,"
ACLU attorney Somil Trivedi and Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve wrote,
"police officers are prosecutors' star witnesses, central to the
prosecutors' ability to earn the convictions that are so essential to
their conception of public safety (and professional success, including
internal promotion)."193 This dependence puts enormous pressure on
prosecutors to get along with the police--even if they lie, withhold
evidence, or use excessive force. Prosecutors who attempt to stand
up to the police pay a professional price.194 "A prosecutor who reports

police crimes or advocates zealous prosecution of the police will
necessarily run afoul of law enforcement's good graces, which may
impact conviction rates and therefore her career advancement,"
Kate Levine explains.196 Should a reform-minded district attorney
anger police unions, her chance of being reelected is significantly
diminished.196 Given the cost of standing up to the police, is it any
surprise that "ample evidence indicates that when police are the
ones committing the crimes, prosecutors deploy their immense
discretion to cover for and effectively encourage the criminality
rather than to combat it and seek justice?"197
Sometimes community outrage over a police killing is so
great that prosecutors cannot simply decline to file charges. In those
instances, they have another option available to them-using a
grand jury as cover. 198 By that I mean, prosecutors can convene a
187 Id. at 10 (117/1134=10.3%).
188
Id. (104/1134=9.2%).
189 Id. (201/1134=17.7%).
190
See Sinyangwe et al., supra note 187, at 5 (11/1134=.097%); Amelia ThomsonDeVeaux et al., Why It's So Rare for Police Officers to Face Legal Consequences,
FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Sept. 23, 2020, 4:53 PM), https:/fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-its-stillso-rare-for-police-officers-to-face-legal-consequences-for-misconduct/ (last visited May 18, 2022).
191 Kate Levine, Who Shouldn't Prosecute the Police, 101 IOWA L. REV. 1447,
1475 (2016).
192 Somil Trivedi & Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve, To Serve and Protect Each
Other: How Police-ProsecutorCodependence Enables PoliceMisconduct, 100 B.U. L. REV.
895, 912 (2020).
193 Id. at 909.
194 Id. at 910.
19 Levine, supra note 191, at 1472.
196 Id. at 1476-77.
197
Trivedi & Van Cleve, supra note 192, at 898.
198
See ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN
PROSECUTOR 25 (2007) (stating that "inmost cases, the grand jury is simply a tool of the
prosecutor"); Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the
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grand jury, deliberately sandbag their case, and then proclaim that
they did their best when the jurors decline to indict. Yet, consider
this: grand juries are not adversarial hearings, and the defendant
usually has no right to present evidence or even be present. 199 "[T]he
prosecutor maintains unilateral control over the grand jury,"200 and
the burden of persuasion is low.201 Because it is an accusatory and
not an adjudicatory proceeding, the Supreme Court has ruled that
the prosecutor has no obligation to present exculpatory evidence.202
That means the prosecutor should almost always win, and he
does.203 In 2016,204 there were just six federal cases across the entire
country where the grand jury failed to indict!205
And yet prosecutors failed to secure an indictment for the
officers that killed Michael Brown20 and Eric Garner.207 Prosecutors
usually present one-sided evidence and the entire proceeding is
completed in anywhere from a few minutes to a few hours.208 But, as
Kate Levine points out, "the Ferguson prosecutors put on hours of
conflicting testimony" in the indictment proceeding for the officer
that killed Michael Brown.209 Similarly, in the Eric Garner case, the
Staten Island prosecutor called "Pantaleo's partner, Justin
D'Amico," to the stand "after [first] granting ... [D'Amico] immunity
from any future prosecution."210 We do not know what D'Amico said
because the records have been sealed,211 but we do know that he lied
Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 260, 269 (1995) ("[I]t has become nearly an article of faith
among both grand jury critics and defenders that the grand jury is a 'rubber stamp' for
the prosecution." (footnotes omitted)).
199
See DAVIS, supra note 198, at 26; see also Leipold, supra note 198, at 266-67.
200 DAVIS, supra note 198, at 25.
201 See Leipold, supranote 198, at 264.
202 United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 51 (1992).
203 Leipold, supra note 198, at 274; Ben Casselman, It's Incredibly Rare for a
Grand Jury to Do What Ferguson'sJust Did, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (Nov. 24, 2014, 9:30 PM),
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/ferguson-michael-brown-indictment-darren-wilson/
(last visited May 18, 2022).
204 Data reported for federal fiscal year 2016, running from October 1, 2015
through September 30, 2016. MARK MOTIVANS, BUREAU OF JUST. STATS., NCJ 251772,
FEDERAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 2016-STATISTICAL TABLES, at 1 n.1 (2020).
205 Id. at 13, tbl.2.3.
200
Casselman, supra note 203.
207 Andrew Siff et al., GrandJury Declines to Indict NYPD Officer in Eric Garner
Chokehold Death, NBC N.Y. (Dec. 4, 2014), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/news/local/
grand-jury-decision-eric-garner-staten-island-chokehold-death-nypd/1427980/ [https://per
ma.cc/TJ32-UHJL].
205 Levine, supra note 191, at 1473.
209 Id.
210 Gregory Krieg, The Eric Garner Case Exposes a Huge Problem with How We
Prosecute Police Officers, MIC (Dec. 4, 2014), https://bit.ly/380B9JA [https://
perma.cc/P9MR-QPKA].
211 J. David Goodman, Appeals Court Rules for Transcript in Eric Garner Case to
Remain Sealed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2015), httpsJ/www.nytimes.com/2015/11/24/nyregion/ap
peals-court-rules-for-transcripts-in-eric-garner-case-to-remain-sealed.html [httpsJ/perma.cc/4X
ND-DP33].
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about what Garner had done in posthumous arrest papers,
making it seem like Garner had committed a felony when his
actions constituted, at most, a misdemeanor.212 All in all, it is
hard to characterize these proceedings as good faith efforts on
the part of either prosecutor to secure an indictment.
But this is all inside baseball. A prosecutor is not going
to say that she is prioritizing her relationship with the police
over her duty to uphold the rule of law; she must have a "good"
reason not to prosecute. So, she often defers instead to the
officer's claim of self-defense,213 which exposes the prosecutor's
implicit racial bias or, more cynically, her faith in the
community's implicit racial bias.214
V.

THE DECISION TO CONVICT

Derek Chauvin's conviction was an aberration. Between the
start of 2005 through June 24, 2019, just 104 nonfederal law

enforcement officers were "arrested for murder or manslaughter
resulting from an on-duty shooting .... [and] [o]f those... [just]
thirty-five [(34 percent)] [were] convicted of a crime."216 Fifteen
pleaded guilty, and of the forty-three that went before a jury, twenty
were convicted (47 percent).216 But how could twelve people not agree
that Officer Michael Slager had committed murder after watching
the cellphone video of him shooting unarmed Walter Scott five times
in the back from a distance of at least fifteen feet?217 And why did
jurors acquit Officer Betty Shelby of manslaughter after watching
video of her shooting Terence Crutcher in the back when he had his
hands raised above his head?218 Implicit bias, as discussed above,
Sisak, supra note 6.
213 Trivedi & Van Cleve, supranote 192, at 901, 905-15.
214 See Robert J. Smith & Justin D. Levinson, The Impact of Implicit Racial Bias
on the Exercise of ProsecutorialDiscretion, 35 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 795, 807-08 (2012).
216 Philip M. Stinson, Sr. & Chloe A. Wenzlof, On-Duty Shootings: Police
212

Officers Charged with Murder or Manslaughter, 2005-2019, BOWLING GREEN STATE
UNIV.: POLICE INTEGRITY RsCH. GRP. (2019), https://scholarworks.bgsu.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1100&context=crimjust-pub
[https://perma.cc/L6YL-CWEY].
Of these, only four were convicted of murder. The others were convicted of lesser offenses,
including manslaughter (nine); voluntary manslaughter
(four); involuntary
manslaughter (five); official misconduct (two); reckless homicide (two); negligent
homicide (three); federal criminal deprivation of civil rights (five), and reckless
discharged of a firearm (one). Id. An additional four officers were convicted of murder,
but their convictions were overturned, and they ended up being convicted of federal
criminal deprivation of civil rights. Id.
216

Id.

Alan Blinder, Mistrial for South Carolina Officer Who Shot Walter-Scott,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/05/us/walter-scott-michaelslager-north-charleston.html [https://perma.cc/7D4M-46FG]; Dwyer, supra note 15;
supranotes 11-19 and accompanying text.
218 See supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
217
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certainly plays a role.219 Preexisting beliefs about Black men being
dangerous or aggressive can impact jurors' perceptions of the

evidence22O and may also impact their willingness to believe a
police officer's claims of being afraid, conflicting evidence
notwithstanding.
We also need to consider who serves as jurors. Every
state has a law that prohibits those "with criminal convictions"
and sometimes "pending charges[] from serving on juries."221

Some only apply to felonies, but others include misdemeanors.222
The net effect of these laws, whether intentional or not, is to
disproportionately exclude Black people. A 2017 study found
that 23 percent of Black adults had a felony conviction,
compared with 6 percent of non-Black adults.223 The study also
found that 33 percent of adult Black men had a felony conviction,
compared with 13 percent of all adult males.224
An absence of Black jurors makes it more difficult for the
prosecution. To convict a police officer of unlawful killing, the
state must convince jurors beyond a reasonable doubt that the
officer did not have the right to use deadly force.225 This burden
is especially onerous when the officer takes the stand and says,
as Officer Betty Shelby did in explaining why she shot an
unarmed Terence Crutcher in the back, "I feared for my life."226
Jurors who trust the police may be more likely to believe her,
and a 2020 Pew Research Center survey taken one month before
George Floyd's death found that there was a large discrepancy
across racial groups in confidence in the police.227 Fifty-six
219 Justin D. Levinson et al., Devaluing Death: An Empirical Study of Implicit
Racial Bias on Jury-Eligible Citizens in Six Death Penalty States, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 513,
513, 546-48 (2014).
220 See Justin D. Levinson & Danielle Young, Different Shades of Bias: Skin
Tone, Implicit Racial Bias, and Judgements of Ambiguous Evidence, 112 W. VA. L. REV.
307, 309 (2010); Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias,
Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345, 345 (2007).
221 Ginger Jackson-Gleich, Rigging the Jury: How Each State Reduces Jury Diversity
by Excluding People with Criminal Records, PRISON POL'Y INMATIVE (Feb. 18, 2021),
https:/www.prisonpolicy.org/reports/juryexclusion.html [https:/perma.cc/98M5-REGY].

222

Id.

Sarah K. S. Shannon et al., The Growth, Scope, and SpatialDistributionof People
with Felony Records in the United States, 1948-2010, 54 DEMOGRAPHY 1795, 1807 (2017).
223

224

Id.

225 See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[W]e explicitly hold that the
Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is
charged."). See also supra notes 90-95 for discussion of the Supreme Court's standard
for police officer use of deadly force.
226 Ortiz & Helsel, supranote 8.
227
Hannah Gilberstadt, A Month Before George Floyd's Death, Black and White
Americans Differed Sharply in Confidence in the Police, PEW RSCH. CTR. (June 5, 2020),
https:/www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2020/06/05/a-month-before-george-floyds-death-black-andwhite-americans-differed-sharply-in-confidence-in-the-police/ [https//permaccNQ2L-GX2M].
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percent of Black Americans "said they had at least a fair amount
of confidence in [the] police . . . to act in the best interests of the
public," compared with 84 percent of white Americans and 74
percent of Hispanic Americans.228
This poll reveals another hurdle for the prosecutionthat of confirmation bias, meaning the tendency for people to
seek or interpret evidence in a manner that is partial to existing
beliefs, expectations, or existing hypotheses.229 Let me explain.
The 2020 Pew Research Center survey found that most
Americans had "at least a fair amount of confidence in [the
police] to act in the best interests of the public."230 It follows that
since most prospective jurors implicitly trust the police, most are

more likely to discount contradictory evidence that conflicts with
this original belief. Nickerson described the general
phenomenon in his oft-cited 1998 article:
A great deal of empirical evidence supports the idea that the
confirmation bias is extensive and strong and that it appears in many
guises. The evidence also supports the view that once one has taken a
position on an issue, one's primary purpose becomes that of defending
or justifying that position. This is to say that regardless of whether
one's treatment of evidence was evenhanded before the stand was
2 31
taken, it can become highly biased afterward.

Of course, there are potential jurors who have had bad
experiences with the police, but they are not likely to be selected
for a jury. Like all criminal defendants, police officers have the
right to a fair and impartial jury.232 This means people who have
been mistreated by the police, know people who have been
mistreated by the police, or have protested against police
violence are likely to be removed for cause or stricken by the
defense through a peremptory challenge.233 The exclusion of a
228 Id.

229 Raymond S. Nickerson, Confirmation Bias: A Ubiquitous Phenomenon in
Many Guises, 2 REV. GEN. PSYCH. 175, 175 (1998).
.
230
Gilberstadt, supra note 227.
231 Nickerson, supra note 229, at 177.
232 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 722 (1961) ("In essence, the right to jury trial
guarantees to the criminally accused a fair trial by a panel of impartial, 'indifferent' jurors.").
. 233 See Thomas Ward Frampton, For Cause: Rethinking Racial Exclusion and the
American Jury, 118 MICH. L. REV. 785, 828-29 (2020); see also Race and the Jury: illegal
Discrimination in Jury Selection, EQUAL JUST. INST. 34-39 (2021), httpsJ/eji.org/wpFor
[https://perma.cc/A5NY-XJ6R].
content/uploads/2005/ll/race-and-the-jury-digital.pdf
discussion of the dismissal of a Black potential juror in Officer Chauvin's trial, see Adrian
Florido, Halfof the Jury in the Chauvin TrialIs Nonwhite. That's Only Partof the Story, NPR
(Mar. 25, 2021, 9:00 AM), https:/www.npr.org/2021/03/25/980646634/half-of-the-jury-in-thechauvin-trial-is-non-white-thats-only-part-of-the-story [https://perma.cc/WJ5U-GYWM]; and
Mary Moriarty, Juror #76: Black Juror's Rejection Reveals Flaws in System, MINN.
SPOKESMANRECORDER (Mar. 18, 2021), https://spokesman-recorder.com/2021/03/8/uror-76black-jurors-rejection-reveals-flaws-in-system/ [https://perma.cc/V7HF-EJRK].
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disproportionate number of Black people due to felony
convictions,234 and of those who have experienced police misconduct
turns juries into institutional mechanisms of structural racism.
And what if the defendant waives his right to a jury trial?
As unlikely as it is for an officer to be convicted by a jury, he is even
less likely to be convicted by a judge.236 Between 2005 and June
2019, none of the nine officers who were tried before a judge for
murder or manslaughter resulting from an on-duty shooting were
convicted.236 Part of the reason why, as Bennett Gershman
explains, is that judges, as former prosecutors, "might have a propolice bias" or they might be able to "more intelligently understand
the circumstances facing the officer when he concluded that lethal
force was necessary."237 Alternatively, an elected judge might not
want to jeopardize the potential endorsement of law
enforcement.238 All of this means that the odds are stacked in favor
of acquittal even before the trial begins.
VI.

THE DECISION TO PUNISH

In the rare event that an officer is convicted of murder,
he is unlikely to do much time. Sure, Derek Chauvin was
sentenced to 22.5 years for the murder of George Floyd, but that
was still 25 percent less than the prosecutor's requested
sentence of 30 years, which itself was 25 percent less than the
maximum sentence of 40 years. 239 And Chauvin was sentenced
to a relatively long time compared with other police officers.
Between 2005 and June 24, 2019, just four nonfederal officers
were convicted of murder.240 These officers were sentenced to 81
months to 192 months in prison with an average sentence of
150.75 months (12.6 years).241 As a point of comparison, the
234

See supra notes 223-224 and accompanying text.
Philip M. Stinson & Chloe Wentzlof, No. 9: On-Duty Shootings: Police
Officers Charged with Murder or Manslaughter, 2005-2019, BOWLING GREEN STATE
UNIV.: RSCH. BRIEF ONE-SHEET (2019), https://www.bgsu.edu/content/dam/BGSU/health
-and-human-services/document/Criminal-Justice-Program/policeintegritylostresearch/[https://
9-On-Duty-Shootings-Police-Officers-Charged-with-Murder-or-Manslaughter.pdf
236

perma.cc/9ZHC-MJLS].
236

Id.

237 Bennett Gershman, Why Do Police Defendants Want to Be Tried by Judges, and
Not By Juries?, LAW & CRIME (Feb. 2, 2018), https//lawandcrime.com/high-profile/why-dopolice-defendants-want-to-be-tried-by-judges-and-not-by-juries/ [https://perma.cc/ZSB6-8MFX].
238 Rebecca Mae Salokar, Endorsements in Judicial Campaigns: The Ethics of
Messaging, 28 JUST. SYS. J. 342, 344 (2007).
239 Bill Chappell, Derek Chauvin Is Sentenced to 22 '/z Years for George Floyd's
Murder, NPR (June 25, 2021, 6:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/trial-over-killingof-george-floyd/2021/06/25/1009524284/derek-chauvin-sentencing-george-floyd-murder
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average sentence length for murder in state courts is 585.6 months

(48.8 years).242 That means police officers who murdered were, on
average sentenced to only one-fourth the time of civilians. Judges'
unwillingness to convict officers during bench trials, as described
above, combined with their sentencing discount for officers who
kill, makes them institutional mechanisms of structural racism.
Before going on, it is worth spending some additional time
on Derek Chauvin. In determining Chauvin's sentence, Judge
Peter A. Cahill had to "ensure that the sanctions imposed ... are
proportional to the severity of the ... offense and the offender's
criminal history."243 Because of Chauvin's nonexistent criminal
history, his presumptive sentence was 150 months.244 Judge Cahill
then determined that there were two aggravating factors involved
in Chauvin's case: (1) abusing a position of trust, 245 and (2) "treating
George Floyd with particular cruelty."246 The judge found no
mitigating factors, and sentenced Chauvin to an additional 120
months for a total of 270 months.247
The fact that Chauvin (or any other officer) had no prior
criminal history does not mean that he had not committed any
crimes. We know that Chauvin was the subject of at least thirtytwo complaints, five of which were sustained and resulted in a
formal reprimand.248 Very little information is publicly available
about those cases, but the prosecutor exposed one of particular note
during the pretrial portion of Chauvin's trial.249 In 2017, Chauvin
and his partner responded to a domestic assault call of a woman
who reported being assaulted by her two minor children, one a
fourteen-year-old boy.250 Chauvin's written report made it seem
like the boy repeatedly resisted arrest, which is why Chauvin
claimed he struck the boy and held him to the floor. But, the body
worn cameras revealed a completely different story.25' The truth is
that the boy told the officers he had been beaten, but they decided to
242 DANIELLE KAEBLE, BUREAU OF JUST. STAT., U.S. DEP'T OF JUST., NCJ
255662, TIME SERVED IN STATE PRISON, 2018, at 4 (2021), https://bjs.ojp.gov/content/pub/
pdf/tsspl8.pdf [https://perma.ccW8KD-77YP].
243
State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 25, 2021)
(alteration in original) (quoting MINNESOTA SENTENCING GUIDELINES 1.A) (sentencing
order and memorandum opinion).
244 Id. at 3-5.

Id. at 7-11.
24 Id. at 11-15.
245

247 Id. at 2, 6, 22.
248 Results: Derek M. Chauvin, Badge #1087, CMTYS. UNITED AGAINST POLICE
BRUTALITY, http://complaints.cuapb.org/policearchive/officer/2377/ [https://perma.cc/X4P
K-Q39U].
249 See State's Supplemental Memorandum of Law in Support of Other
Evidence at 2, State v. Chauvin, No. 27-CR-20-12646 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 25, 2021).
260 Id. at 1-2.
261 Id. at 2-3.
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arrest him anyway. 25 2 After ordering the boy to come out of his
bedroom, they waited thirty-three seconds before grabbing him.253
Chauvin then hit the boy with a flashlight, grabbed him by the
throat, and hit him again in the head with the flashlight.254 The boy
then "cried out that they were hurting him and [asked them] to
stop," but instead Chauvin applied a neck restraint to the boy, which
caused him to lose consciousness and go to the ground.255 Chauvin
and his partner put the boy in the prone position (meaning on his
stomach) and handcuffed him behind his back.256 Chauvin then held
him down, knee-to-upper back, just as he held down George Floyd,
all the while as the boy complained that he could not breathe and as
his mother begged for Chauvin to let him go. 2 7 Chauvin continued
to hold the boy down even though the boy was already handcuffed
and even though the boy's ear was actively bleeding and the boy was
repeatedly telling the officers that he was in pain.28 Eventually, a
paramedic arrived, examined the boy's ear, and told him he would
need stitches.29 Two minutes later, Chauvin told the boy he was
under arrest, tightened the handcuffs, and finally-seventeen
minutes after first restraining the boy to the floor and kneeling on
him-removed his knee from the boy's back.260 Two minutes after
that, Chauvin and his partner assisted the boy in rolling to one side
and standing up before walking him to a waiting ambulance."261
For four years, it seemed that this case would be ignored. The
Minneapolis police have a long history of abuse accusations, and
past attempts at reform have been unsuccessful.22 The boy Chauvin
struck and held down is Black, which is consistent with complaints
of racism (including those made by police officers against the
department263) and excessive force disproportionately inflicted
against Black people.264 Chauvin's partner was legally obligated to
252
253
254

255
256

Id. at 3-5.
Id. at 3.

Id.
Id. at 3-4.
Id. at 4.

257 Id. at 4, 6.
258 Id. at 4.
259 Id. at 5.
260 Id.
261
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262 Shaila Dewan & Serge F. Kovaleski, Thousands of Complaints Do Little to
ChangePolice Ways, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/us/
derek-chauvin-george-floyd.html [https://perma.cc/8GEU-HHJD].
263 See, e.g., Complaint & Demand for a Jury Trial at 4, Arradondo v. Minneapolis,
2015 WL 4727202 (D. Minn. Aug. 10, 2015) (No. 13-2488) (five police officers suing the
Minneapolis Police Department to "redress race and color discrimination in employment").
264 See Matt Furber et al., Minneapolis Police, Long Accused of Racism, Face
Wrath of Wounded City, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
05/27/us/minneapolis-police.html [https://perma.c/4NYH-46BU].
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report the abuse,25 but his silence was nothing out of the ordinary.
As the Minnesota Reformer explained, "[t]he clearest pattern to
emerge when examining the disciplinary files is that when a
Minneapolis police officer does something wrong, no matter how
big or small, other officers on the scene will minimize what
happened or report not having seen or heard anything."266 Nor did
the state prosecutor ever prosecute even though there was body
camera footage documenting Chauvin's misdeeds.267
Finally, in May 2021, Chauvin was indicted for violating
the boy's federal civil rights,268 and he pleaded guilty seven months
later.269 Ironically it was the same day he pleaded guilty to violating
the civil rights of George Floyd27O-a person whose life might have
been spared if the police and prosecutor had held Chauvin to
account earlier. The delayed prosecution also meant Judge Cahill
was presented with a whitewashed criminal history, which in turn
meant he could not sentence Chauvin to the time he arguably
deserved under Minnesota law for murdering George Floyd.
VII.

SOLUTIONS

In this article, I have discussed the ways in which state
actors exploit prior victimization in justifying and minimizing

police killings. Doing something about this issue will be difficult
given the deep-seated structural roots of this victimization and
the way different actors work together (even if unintentionally)
to perpetuate it. Only a multiplicity of reforms will be able to
enact meaningful and lasting change.
Scholars and activists often focus on reforms that will
change police behavior through deterrence rooted in
punishment. For instance, if it becomes more difficult as a
matter of law to assert that use of deadly force was justified,
then officers will be less likely to shoot because they will fear going
262 See Max Nesterak & Tony Webster, The Bad Cops: How Minneapolis
Protects Its Worst Police Officers Until It's Too Late, MINN. REFORMER (Dec. 15, 2020,

5:30 AM), https://bit.ly/37XCYa9 [https://perma.cc/GP7G-EPGP].
266 Id.
267 Id.
265 Ray Sanchez & Omar Jimenez, What We Know About the 2017 Encounterthat Led
to Derek Chauvin'sSecond Indictment, CNN (May 7, 2021,3:44 PM), httpsJ/www.cnn.com/2021
/05/07/us/derek-chauvin-indictment-2017-incident/index.html [https//permacc/7ATF-FF5S].
269 Erin Brady, Derek Chauvin Pleads Guilty to Violating Civil Rights of George
Floyd and 14-Year-Old Boy, NEWSWEEK (Dec. 15, 2021, 11:00 AM), https://www.news
week.com/derek-chauvin-pleads-guilty-violating-civil-rights-george-floyd-14-year-old-bo

y-1659707 [https://perma.cc/MJ65-NYQW].
270 Leila Fadel, Derek Chauvin Pleads Guilty to Violating George Floyd's Civil
Rights in Federal Court, NPR (Dec. 15, 2021, 4:28 PM), https://www.npr.org/2021/12/15/
1064614556/derek-chauvin-pleads-guilty-to-violating-george-floyds-civil-rights-in-feder
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to prison.271 Or, if legislatures abolish or at least abrogate qualified
immunity, then police officers will think twice before striking
someone with their baton because they will worry about being held
civilly liable.272 Although these changes should be made, they are
unlikely to be as effective as people hope. After all, it is still a
prosecutor who decides whether to charge a police officer with
murder and a judge or jury who decides whether to convict. The law
of qualified immunity should also change, but the Supreme Court
has thus far been unwilling to do so.2 73 Even if the Court does change
the standard, it is still a judge or jury that will decide whether a
violation occurred.
In addition to pushing for these changes, policy makers
should follow the lead of Franklin Zimring274 and Lawrence W.
Sherman27l in trying to reduce police killings by moving the focus
from blaming individual officers to identifying change points
that can save lives. For example, they should try and reduce the
opportunity for lethal force. Ten percent of police killings in 2021
started with a traffic stop.276 Legislatures should reduce the
likelihood of a potentially lethal traffic stop by changing the law
on civil forfeiture. Most civil forfeiture laws allow the police to
keep the property they seize,277 which creates an incentive to use
minor traffic infractions as a pretext for stopping people.278

Legislatures should amend these laws to remove this incentive.
The laws should also be amended to make it more difficult for
the state to strip a person of their property. Without these
financial incentives, the police are likely to conduct fewer traffic
stops, which in turn should reduce the number of police killings.
271
See Cynthia Lee, Reforming the Law on Police Use of Deadly Force: DeEscalation, Preseizure Conduct, and Imperfect Self-Defense, 2 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 638
(2018); see also Jane Coaston, California'sNew Law to Stop Police Shootings, Explained,
VOX (Aug. 23, 2019, 1:00 PM), https://www.vox.com/2019/8/23/20826646/california-actto-save-lives-ab-392-explained [https://perma.cc/9DPV-7MJ2].
272
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Failure, POL'Y ANALYSIS (Cato Inst., Wash. D.C.), Sept. 14, 2020, at 13-16, 19, https://
www.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/2020-09/pa-901-update.pdf [https://perma.cc/7VU3-3WPZ].
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274 See generally FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, WHEN POLICE KILL (2017)
(recommending federal, state, and local policy changes to reduce police killings).
276 See generally Lawrence W. Sherman, Reducing Fatal Police Shootings as
System Crashes: Research, Theory, and Practice, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 421 (2018)
(proposing a theoretical framework to reduce fatal police shootings).
276 See supra note 190 and accompanying text.
277 David Pimentel, Civil Asset Forfeiture Abuses: Can State Legislation Solve
this Problem?, 25 GEO. MASON L. REV. 173, 173, 181-82 (2017).
278 How Crime Pays, supra note 62, at 2388; Nick Sibilla & Inst. for Just., Cops
Use Traffic Stops to Seize Millions From Drivers Never Charged With a Crime, FORBES
(Mar. 12, 2014, 11:38 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/instituteforjustice/2014/
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In instances when police do engage a suspect, the
question becomes how we can lessen the chance that they will
use deadly force. Sherman contends that we should design
policing systems that place "preservation of life on an equal (and
often higher) level with swift enforcement of the law."279
Sherman tells the story of a man in Camden, New Jersey who
brandished a knife and then walked away, slashing the knife in
the air as he walked.280 Instead of opening fire on the man, up to
fifteen police officers and two police cars surrounded the man
and walked with him for at least seven minutes.281 This approach
allowed them to contain the risk and keep the community safe
until they had the opportunity to disarm the man and put him
under arrest. 28 2

When a shooting does take place, then saving the life of
the victim becomes paramount. Officers should be required to
make every effort to save the victim's life. To that end, Sherman
suggests having officers carry and be trained in the use of
"battlefield-grade hemostatic bandages" immediately after a
shooting has occurred.283 Sherman also recommends requiring
officers to transport the wounded in patrol cars instead of
waiting for an ambulance.24 Both of these interventions will
help save lives.
Even with these changes, people will continue to die in
police custody. When they do, it is critical that an independent
forensic pathologist determine their manner of death. That
means states should follow the recommendations of the National
Academy of Sciences and abolish the existing coroner systems. 25
Journalist Radley Balko's explanation as to why hits the nail on
the head: "The very act of electing someone to determine manner
of death suggests that there's room for political factors to guide
or influence that determination. That shouldn't be something we
encourage."286 Also in line with the recommendations of the
National Academy of Sciences, Congress should authorize and
appropriate sufficient funds to create regional medical examiner
systems, modernize facilities, and provide adequate education,
279 Lawrence W. Sherman, Reducing FatalPolice Shootings as System Crashes:
Research, Theory, and Practice, 1 ANN. REV. CRIMINOLOGY 421, 441 (2018).
280
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training and staffing of medical examiner offices.287 To insulate
medical examiners from pressure when they investigate and testify
in cases of police violence, legislatures should afford them official
whistleblower status. 288
CONCLUSION

The killings of George Floyd, Eric Garner, Terence
Crutcher, and Michael Scott are more than just isolated tragedies.
They are manifestations of a structurally racist criminal justice
system. Eduardo Bonilla-Silva describes that system well when he
writes, "[i]n contrast to race relations in the Jim Crow period,
however, racial practices that reproduce racial inequality in
contemporary

America

(1)

are

increasingly

covert,

(2)

are

embedded in normal operations of institutions, (3) avoid direct
racial terminology, and (4) are invisible to most Whites."289
From arrest through sentencing, the fact of race, the legacy
of slavery, and the legal consequences of that legacy are imbedded
in the very foundations of our legal system. Police, coroners,
prosecutors, jurors,

and judges. However

unintentionally or

unaware, each perpetuates a system in which Black people are
more likely to die at the hands of the police because police aren't
held accountable. In this article, I have discussed the various
institutional mechanisms that help to reproduce and legitimize
police killings. They include vagrancy and civil forfeiture laws,
deployed
been
neutral have
facially
though
which,
disproportionately against Black people; institutions like the
Supreme Court, which has effectively legitimized racial profiling
by the police; and actors like prosecutors and coroners who are so
intertwined with law enforcement that it is almost impossible to
hold the police accountable.
The most insidious mechanism of all, however, is the way
prior mistreatment has been harnessed against Black people
as justification for continuing state violence against them. Police
officers exploit this mistreatment in justifying the decision to arrest
and the subsequent use of deadly force; coroners and medical
of death
examiners wield it when assigning cause
to something other than the police; prosecutors harness it
in rationalizing the decision not to charge; jurors employ it
when deciding not to convict; and judges lean on it when
minimizing punishment.
27 COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC ScIs. CMTY., supra
note 285, at 267.
288
See FatalPolice Violence by Race and State, supra note 121, at 1251.
289 Bonilla-Silva, supra note 21, at 476.
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Although prosecuting individual officers who kill is
important, it fails to address the more foundational problem.
Unless and until we acknowledge the racial foundation of our
criminal justice system, we will never be able to truly address
police violence. At stake is nothing less than the next George Floyd,
Eric Garner, Terence Crutcher, or Michael Scott.

